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A B S T R A C T
In order to mitigate human and ﬁnancial losses as a result of future global pandemics, we must plan now.
As the Ebola virus pandemic declines, we must reﬂect on how we have mismanaged this recent
international crisis and how we can better prepare for the next global pandemic. Of great concern is the
increasing frequency of pandemics occurring over the last few decades. Clearly, the window of
opportunity to act is closing. This editorial discusses many issues including priority emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases; the challenges of meeting international health regulations; the
strengthening of global health systems; global pandemic funding; and the One Health approach to
future pandemic planning. We recommend that the global health community unites to urgently address
these issues in order to avoid the next humanitarian crisis.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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The West African Ebola virus pandemic has shown us yet again
that the world is ill prepared to respond to a global health
emergency. This follows similar statements that were made after
the H1N1outbreak in 2009 that ‘‘The world is ill prepared to
respond to a severe inﬂuenza pandemic or to any similar global,
sustained and threatening public health emergency’’.1 Our
response to the Ebola zoonotic ‘spillover’ was delayed and as a
result 11,158 people lost their lives in nine countries.2 The direct
ﬁnancial cost of the Ebola pandemic was estimated to be in the
vicinity of six billion US dollars and global economic losses over
15 billion dollars.3 Clearly there are lessons to be learnt from the
Ebola outbreak.
In 2005, following the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) pandemic, the International Health Regulations (IHR) were
modiﬁed. While two thirds of the 194 World Health Assembly
countries have failed to comply with the regulations as of 2015,
and for the one third who say they did, there are serious concerns
about the reliability of their self-assessment.4 Now, with Liberia
declared free of Ebola and declining incidence in Sierra Leone and
Guinea, these same regulations are once again being revisited after
more than a decade.4 Is this a futile exercise and should the IHRs be
abandoned if they cannot be enforced by WHO and fulﬁlled by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) member nations? The national
health systems in West Africa, and for most low and middle income
countries (LMICs), would not meet IHR standards (despite claims
by some member WHA nations) and it is unlikely that following
the Ebola pandemic much will change.
Many have stated that WHO failed to respond to the current
Ebola epidemic in a timely manner4 but even if they did, would thehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2015.07.016
1201-9712/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).outcome have been really that different? There were no drugs or
vaccines available to treat and prevent the disease, thus quaran-
tine, isolation and safe burials were the primary methods utilized
to halt the spread of disease and were initiated by the afﬂicted
nations themselves.5 It typically takes years if not decades to
develop a vaccine or drug that will have public health impact. One
only has to look at the countless billions that have been spent on
trying to develop a vaccine for HIV, thus far without success.
Moreover, weak, malnourished, immunosuppressed populations
living in poverty with little or no hygiene, sanitation or running
water will always be highly susceptible to new emerging or re-
emerging infectious diseases.6 At ‘ground zero’ of the Ebola
epidemic it was believed that in 2013, hungry children living in the
remote Guinean village of Meliandou killed and ate infected fruit
bats.7,8 Thus, what can realistically be done to prevent and contain
future national epidemics from becoming global pandemics? We
discuss a number of issues that urgently need to be addressed in
order to plan, and possibly prevent, the next global pandemic.
2. Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases
If one looks at the history of emerging or re-emerging infectious
disease pandemics globally, on average they have appeared every
decade but now, worryingly, the frequency between pandemics
seems to be disturbingly shorter as evident with Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, Inﬂuenza A H1N5 (bird ﬂu)
in 2007, H1N1 (swine ﬂu) in 2009, Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 and Ebola in 2014.9 Overpopulation and
poverty are the primary contributing factors that have brought
about this change and are strongly linked with global warming,
environmental degradation, habitat destruction, and increasedciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
Figure 1. The breeding grounds for the next global pandemic: left panel illustrates slums in Metro-Manila, The Philippines; the middle panel shows slums in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, and the right panel displays slums in Kibera, Kenya. Note photographs are available on public domain.
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tions in LMICs serve as the breeding grounds for future pandemics
(Figure 1). For example, in metro Manila, the most densely
populated city in the world, approximately six million people live
in slums with no piped water or toilets. According to WHO,
137 million people in urban centres have no access to safe drinking
water and over 600 million lack sanitation.10 The UN predicts that
the world’s urban population will double to over six billion by
2050 and most of the increase in density will occur in LMICs.10
Population density is directly correlated with the rate of
transmission of respiratory and faecal-oral pathogens (e.g.
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, inﬂuenza, cholera, rotavirus, hel-
minths).10
Between 1940 and 2004 there were 335 emerging infectious
disease (EID) origins reported globally.9 Figure 2 illustrates some of
the most recent EID epidemics. EIDs are primarily zoonotic (60%),
originating in wildlife populations (e.g. HIV, SARS, Ebola, West Nile
Virus, Lyme Disease) but bacterial pathogens have become
increasingly of concern due to antibiotic resistance especially in
the developing world.9,11 Multidrug-resistance (MDR) to Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis, Streptococcus pneumoniae and Staphylococ-
cus aureus are a global concern and gram-negative bacteria
resistance to b-lactams is widespread.11 Drug resistance to
enteropathogens has also become a major global health challenge.
MDR Salmonella enterica Typhi and S. enterica Paratyphi are
common in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, and there are increasing
reports of reduced susceptibility to ﬂuoroquinolones.12 Campylo-
bacter jejuni resistance to ﬂuoroquinolones has become a concern
in Southeast Asia, with rates of resistance of 80% reported from
Thailand.12 Viral pathogens (e.g. Ebola, Makona variant (EBOV),
MERS-CoV, H1N1) are also of concern due to their high rates of
nucleotide substitution, poor mutation error-correction rate
ability and capacity to quickly adapt to human hosts.9
Table 1 displays some potentially pandemic pathogens that
should be under active global surveillance. The current outbreak of
MERS-CoV in South Korea is of grave concern given the case fatalityrate is over 10%. Surveillance of zoonotic diseases is largely based
on detecting illnesses in humans who often serve as the sentinel
species and dead-end hosts.13 Apart from rabies, most national
surveillance systems in the world do not monitor zoonotic diseases
appearing in wildlife, yet 72% of zoonotic EIDs (e.g. Anthrax, Nipah
virus, Hantavirus, type A inﬂuenza, SARS, MERS-CoV, Ebola) come
from this source.9,13 Many RNA viruses have emerged and
dispersed globally such as Chikungunya virus, West Nile virus
and dengue virus. These three arboviruses alone have morbidity
and mortality rates that far exceed those of the combined rates of
SARS, Ebola and MERS-CoV.14,15 Thus, EID discovery efforts need to
be directed toward reservoirs and vectors at the human-animal
interface.16 The integration of human, veterinary, and agricultural
medicine, as proposed by the ‘One Health’ approach, should result
in earlier warning of EIDs and provide us with a better opportunity
to respond to potential spill-over threats.13,17 Moreover, targeting
surveillance to regional hotspots of EIDs provides an evidence-
based rationale for more appropriate allocation of global
resources.16
3. International Health Regulations (IHR)
The 2014 outbreak of Ebola once again tested the revised
2005 IHR. According to Gostin and Friedman (2015) ‘‘WHO fell
short of its leadership responsibilities, and the IHR – the governing
legal framework – displayed deﬁciencies’’.3 The three West African
countries involved (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone) in the pandemic
failed to comply with the IHRs capacity-building mandate and, to
date, two thirds of WHA member countries have failed to comply
with the same regulations.3,4 Of the one third of the WHA member
nations that said they did comply, there has been no evaluation to
verify their claims.3,4 Like the outbreak of H1N1 in 2009, the
response raises questions regarding the extent to which the IHR
can serve as a framework for global pandemic responses.3,4,18
If the WHA member nations (194) do not take the IHR core
capacity-building requirements of disease surveillance, reporting,
Figure 2. The map shows the location of recent emerging infectious diseases caused primarily by zoonotic diseases transmitted to humans via insect vectors, or animals. Note
the ‘one-health’ map is available on public domain.
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international framework? In reality WHA member nations from
LMICs see the regulations as an enormous obligation primarily
developed to protect the health and welfare of developed
nations.3,18 During the Ebola outbreak, controversy arose when
American and Spanish nationals were preferentially chosen to
receive the experimental drug ZMapp over West African
nationals.19 Moreover, when foreign medical staff became infected
they were ﬂown home for what was deemed superior medical care.
Clearly these ethical issues, which are well known by the WHA
member representatives, will impact on future IHR compliance.
Furthermore, member nations from LMICs do not have the national
capacity to adhere to IHR, given they have very weak infrastructure
and poorly ﬁnanced health systems.3 LMICs must be given
considerable ﬁnancial and capacity building assistance or they
will be unable to comply. These massive inequities must be
addressed if we are to plan appropriately for the next pandemic.
4. Global Health System Strengthening
For most countries in the developing world it is difﬁcult to
improve their health systems to a standard that is similar to that of
high-income countries. Moreover, as mentioned, most LMIC
countries will not be able to establish core IHR capabilities
without considerable donor support and international assistance
for training, creating the necessary laboratory infrastructure for
prompt diagnosis, and the technology required for ‘real-time’
reporting of epidemics.20 Point of care screening tests for use in
community health posts are increasingly available for rapid
diagnosis of emerging pathogens and will shorten the time from
presentation to treatment. However improvements and access to
diagnostic technologies will need to be supported by the capacity
to interpret and act on the ﬁndings. Presently limited health-care
dollars are spent on running tertiary national hospitals with little,
or none, spent on preventive services, disease control or epidemic
preparedness. However, most countries do have ofﬁces or
departments for communicable disease control with the number
of staff engaged in such full-time activities varying considerably. At
the district/municipal level most developing countries have
medical health ofﬁcers and at the community level a considerable
human resource of community health workers (CHWs).
Gostin and Friedman (2015) have proposed a new global health
framework with robust national health systems at its foundationand an empowered WHO at its apex.3 However, WHO has failed to
provide the necessary leadership to coordinate global health
emergencies on the ground and adequately support WHA member
nations to develop core IHR capacities. In September 2014, the UN
assumed leadership of the Ebola response and created the UN
Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER), the ﬁrst UN
mission to respond to public health emergencies.3 In contrast with
IHR recommendations, Security Council resolutions are legally
binding for member countries.3 We now propose a new UN Centre
for Disease Control (UN CDC), potentially based in New York, to
serve at the apex of a new global health framework with a number
of new and existing regional CDCs reporting directly to it (Figure 3).
A proposed structure might be: National CDC departments
reporting to their regional CDCs, and Provincial/District/Municipal
CDC departments reporting to their National CDCs with Commu-
nity Health Workers at local health centres reporting to their
municipal health ofﬁcers. In sum, at the apex of our proposed
global health framework would sit a new UN CDC with Security
Council authority and at the foundation, CHWs in local health
centres. CHWs have transformed the health-care systems of many
developing nations including Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, and
Malawi and are absolutely crucial for future global security.21
5. Global Pandemic Funding
On October 10th 2014, World Bank President, Dr Jim Yong Kim,
has proposed a new pandemic emergency facility (PEF).22 As stated
on their website ‘‘The World Bank Group is playing a lead role in
conceptualizing the facility, working in coordination with inter-
national organizations, including the WHO, the private sector and
other development partners. PEF is a global ﬁnancing facility that
would channel funds swiftly to governments, multilateral agen-
cies, NGOs and others, to ﬁnance efforts to contain dangerous
epidemic outbreaks before they turn into pandemics. Financing
from the PEF will be linked to strong country-level epidemic and
pandemic emergency preparedness plans, thereby incentivizing
recipient governments and the international community to
introduce greater rigor and discipline into crisis preparedness
and reduce the potential for moral hazard. The PEF is expected to
cover a range of response activities such as: (i) rapid deployment of
a trained and ready health care work force; (ii) medical equipment,
pharmaceuticals and diagnostic supplies; (iii) logistics and food
supplies; and (iv) coordination and communication. The PEF would
Table 1
Potential pathogens of a future global pandemic.
Pathogen Areas of High Risk Modes of Transmission Incubation Common Vaccine Treatment
Period Symptoms
Inﬂuenza A Asia, South East Asia, Wild birds, poultry,
pigs,
1-4 days Productive cough, sore
throat,
Fluvax1, inactivated
split virion;
Oseltamivir (Tamiﬂu)
30-75mg
e.g. H1N1, H5N1, Middle East humans (respiratory) fever, malaise,
myalgia,
LAIV, live attenuated
nasal spray
twice daily for 5 days;
H3N2 rhinitis Zanamivir (Relenza)
10mg
inhaled every 12hr for
5days
MERS-CoV Middle East, Asia Bats, camels, 2-14 days As above No vaccine available No antiviral treatment
humans contact
Ebola Central Africa, West
Africa
Bats, human body
ﬂuids
2-21 days Haemorrhage, fever,
sore throat
No vaccine available No antiviral treatment
vomiting, diarrohea,
muscular
pain, headache, rash
MDR-Malaria South East Asia, East
Africa
Anopheles mosquito 9-14 days Fever, headache, chills,
vomiting
No vaccine available ACTsy recommended
e.g. P. falciparum South America e.g.Artemether,40mg+
lumefantrine, 240 mg
twice a
day for 3 days
Chikungunya Africa, Southeast Asia,
Asia,
Aedes mosquito 2-12 days Biphasic fever, joint
pain,
No vaccine available No antiviral treatment
Caribbean, Venezuela,
USA,
maculopapular rash,
uveitis,
France, Italy, Australia headache, vomiting,
insomnia
Campylobacteria South Asia, Poultry, milk, 1-4 days Acute watery diarrhea,
fever
No vaccine available Azithromycin, 500 mg
South-east Asia drinking water once a day for 3 days
Salmonella South Asia, Africa Human contact, food, 5-14 days Fever, headache,
malaise,
Attenuated strain
Ty21a
Ciproﬂoxacin,
20 mg/kg/day
Serovar typhi South East Asia,
Oceania
drinking water abdominal pain,
diarrhea
typhoid vaccine; Vi
capsular
for 7 days; or
Azithromycin,
polysacchride typhoid
vaccine;
20 mg/kg/day for
7 days
Nontyphoidal Poutry, eggs, meat 8-24hr Killed whole-cell
typhoid vaccine
Note: All ﬁgures were obtained from public domain. yACT = Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy.
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Figure 3. A proposed global health security hierarchy: the UN Center for Disease Control (UN CDC) will serve as the command headquarters for global health security and
pandemic response. The regional CDCs in South America (SA CDC), Stockholm, Europe (European CDC), Ethiopia, Africa (A CDC), Southeast Asia (SEA CDC), East Asia (EA CDC),
and Oceania (O CDC) will report directly to the UN CDC along with the USA CDC and the BC CDC in Canada. National CDC departments will report to their regional CDCs, and
Provincial, District, and Municipal CDC departments will report to the National CDC. All health centers at the local village level will report to their municipal/district ofﬁces.
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of $1 billion is available for all of the 77 poorest countries through
June 2017.’’22
If the WHO contingency fund (100 million US dollars) and the
World Bank pandemic emergency facility cannot be utilised to
strengthen national health systems in LMICs in order to meet IHRs
core capabilities, then how can this be achieved? A multi-billion US
dollar International Health System fund has been proposed3 but
considerable funding from both the private and public sector will
need to be secured if the fund is to be successfully launched. The
G20, the European Union, and philanthropic organizations will
need to contribute. The implementation and monitoring of such
funds at the national level will have to be carefully scrutinised and
audited if the core capacities of the IHRs are to be achieved and
maintained. Ultimately LMIC nations themselves will need to
allocate health care dollars toward health prevention and epidemic
planning. For many LMICs this is not a priority and they are ill
prepared to respond to epidemics on their own soils. Building
national capacity is the rate limiting step for global health security.
If the international community fails to support this capacity-
building initiative then this puts the world in a precarious situation
with regard to future pandemics.
6. Conclusions
It is well known in management circles that ‘if one fails to plan
then one should plan to fail’. With regard to pandemic planning, if
we fail to build national epidemic capacities in LMICs then we
should plan to deal with a global pandemic in the not too distant
future. However, in order to build such national capacity it willtake considerable international political will that at the moment
seems to be lacking. Instead of allocating huge resources that
‘react’ to pandemics, funds must be earmarked to ‘prevent’
pandemics. This would include building national capacities of
LMICs and smart surveillance of EIDs in identiﬁed hotspots in the
tropical and subtropical world. What are the likely organisms to
cause a future pandemic and where will they originate from?
Zoonosis from wildlife represents the most signiﬁcant global
health threat of our time yet little funds are spent monitoring and
identifying new zoonotic pathogens originating in wildlife. Clearly
a ‘One Health’ approach is the way forward.
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